Related papers: The Implementability of Liberalism
[J. Moore and R. Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [B. Dutta and A. Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two important papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Recently, [H. Wu, Quantum…
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.…
We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common resource, settlement of debts, and division of goods. The…
In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…
We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice. This is one…
In coalitional games, a player $i$ is regarded as strictly more desirable than player $j$ if substituting $j$ with $i$ within any coalition leads to a strict augmentation in the value of certain coalitions, while preserving the value of the…
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…
We study the computation of Nash equilibria in a two-player normal form game from the perspective of parameterized complexity. Recent results proved hardness for a number of variants, when parameterized by the support size. We complement…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
The betweenness property of preference relations states that a probability mixture of two lotteries should lie between them in preference. It is a weakened form of the independence property and hence satisfied in expected utility theory…
Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function…
Implementation theory has made significant advances in characterizing which social choice functions can be implemented in Nash equilibrium, but these results typically assume sophisticated strategic reasoning by agents. However, evidence…
We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of…
Any individual's preference represents his choice in the set of available options. It is said to be complete if the person can compare any pair of available options. We aim to initiate the notion of projected solutions for the generalized…
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that \emph{care only about consensus}: that is, (a) an agent's utility depends only on…
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…
We study random joint choice rules, allowing for interdependence of choice across agents. These capture random choice by multiple agents, or a single agent across goods or time periods. Our interest is in separable choice rules, where each…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…