Related papers: Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the existence and complexity…
In graph realization problems one is given a degree sequence and the task is to decide whether there is a graph whose vertex degrees match to the given sequence. This realization problem is known to be polynomial-time solvable when the…
We study a simple exchange model in which price is fixed and the amount of a good transferred between actors depends only on the actors' respective budgets and the existence of a link between transacting actors. The model induces a…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated…
Given an undirected graph G, the edge orientation problem asks for assigning a direction to each edge to convert G into a directed graph. The aim is to minimize the maximum out degree of a vertex in the resulting directed graph. This…
We study fair resource allocation under a connectedness constraint wherein a set of indivisible items are arranged on a path and only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. An allocation is deemed fair if it satisfies…
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…
Ensuring fairness while limiting costs, such as transportation or storage, is an important challenge in resource allocation, yet most work has focused on cost minimization without fairness or fairness without explicit cost considerations.…
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate a set of m indivisible chores to a group of n agents, each of which has a general additive cost function on the items. Since envy-free (EF) allocations are not guaranteed to exist, we consider…
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to $n$ agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up…
We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with $k$ distinct additive valuations, with the goal of achieving approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha-\mathrm{EFX}$). It is known that EFX…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and quantify the loss of fairness when we impose a constraint that each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on well-studied fairness notions…
The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental open problem in discrete fair division. Given a set of agents and indivisible goods, the goal is to determine the existence of an allocation where no agent envies another following the…
We study four NP-hard optimal seat arrangement problems [Bodlaender et al., 2020a], which each have as input a set of n agents, where each agent has cardinal preferences over other agents, and an n-vertex undirected graph (called seat…
An edge-colored directed graph is \emph{observable} if an agent that moves along its edges is able to determine his position in the graph after a sufficiently long observation of the edge colors. When the agent is able to determine his…
We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…
In the fair division of items among interested agents, envy-freeness is possibly the most favoured and widely studied formalisation of fairness. For indivisible items, envy-free allocations may not exist in trivial cases, and hence research…
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a…
We consider the fair division problem of indivisible items. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist, and a relaxed version of envy-freeness, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), has been widely considered. In an EF1…
In fair division problems, we are given a set $S$ of $m$ items and a set $N$ of $n$ agents with individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each agent finds the allocation fair. There are…