Related papers: Minimal Stable Voting Rules
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a…
It is proposed that self-organisation (SO) in non-equilibrium systems is governed by a general principle: it emerges when a minute subset of system configurations are exceptionally stable and long-lived to survive the noise generated by the…
In the context of stability of the extremes of a random variable X with respect to a positive integer valued random variable N we discuss the cases (i) X is exponential (ii) non-geometric laws for N (iii) identifying N for the stability of…
This paper studies sequential quantum games under the assumption that the moves of the players are drawn from groups and not just plain sets. The extra group structure makes possible to easily derive some very general results characterizing…
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
We analyze the evolution of political organizations using a model in which agents change their opinions via two competing mechanisms. Two agents may interact and reach consensus, and additionally, individual agents may spontaneously change…
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…
Committee-selection problems arise in many contexts and applications, and there has been increasing interest within the social choice research community on identifying which properties are satisfied by different multi-winner voting rules.…
Max-stability is the property that taking a maximum between two inputs results in a maximum between two outputs. We study max-stability with respect to first-order stochastic dominance, the most fundamental notion of stochastic dominance in…
Dynamics in a distributed system are self-stabilizing if they are guaranteed to reach a stable state regardless of how the system is initialized. Game dynamics are uncoupled if each player's behavior is independent of the other players'…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
In this paper we study social exclusion in social (information) networks using a game-theoretic approach, and study the stability of a certain class community structures that are a Nash equilibrium. The main result of our analysis shows…
The voter model is a toy model of consensus formation based on nearest-neighbor interactions. A voter sits at each vertex in a hypercubic lattice (of dimension $d$) and is in one of two possible opinion states. The opinion state of each…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…
The constrained voter model describes the dynamics of opinions in a population of individuals located on a connected graph. Each agent is characterized by her opinion, where the set of opinions is represented by a finite sequence of…
Ranking individuals based on their performance in different coalitions is a problem emerging in various domains (teams sports, scientific evaluation, argumentation, etc.). Often, for practical reasons, the number of comparable coalitions is…
The emergence of complex structures in the systems governed by a simple set of rules is among the most fascinating aspects of Nature. The particularly powerful and versatile model suitable for investigating this phenomenon is provided by…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…