Related papers: Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules
A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question by considering the Condorcet Jury…
We prove that there is no preferential voting method satisfying the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, positive involvement (if a candidate $x$ wins in an initial preference profile, then adding a voter who ranks $x$ uniquely first cannot…
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
Level-1 Consensus is a property of a preference-profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists a preference relation which induces an ordering of all other preferences such that frequent preferences are those that are more similar to it.…
Many applications, such as content moderation and recommendation, require reviewing and scoring a large number of alternatives. Doing so robustly is however very challenging. Indeed, voters' inputs are inevitably sparse: most alternatives…
In the face of adverse motives, it is indispensable to achieve a consensus. Elections have been the canonical way by which modern democracy has operated since the 17th century. Nowadays, they regulate markets, provide an engine for modern…
There is a growing need for discrete choice models that account for the complex nature of human choices, escaping traditional behavioral assumptions such as the transitivity of pairwise preferences. Recently, several parametric models of…
Almost all dependable systems use some form of redundancy in order to increase fault-tolerance. Very popular are the $N$-Modular Redundant (NMR) systems in which a majority voter chooses the voting output. However, elaborate systems require…
A current paradigm in computer simulation studies of social sciences problems by physicists is the emergence of consensus. The question is to establish when the dynamics of a set of interacting agents that can choose among several options…
Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…
Committee-selection problems arise in many contexts and applications, and there has been increasing interest within the social choice research community on identifying which properties are satisfied by different multi-winner voting rules.…
The basic idea of voting protocols is that nodes query a sample of other nodes and adjust their own opinion throughout several rounds based on the proportion of the sampled opinions. In the classic model, it is assumed that all nodes have…
This paper is dedicated to a cautious learning methodology for predicting preferences between alternatives characterized by binary attributes (formally, each alternative is seen as a subset of attributes). By "cautious", we mean that the…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
A binary constraint system game is a two-player one-round non-local game defined by a system of Boolean constraints. The game has a perfect quantum strategy if and only if the constraint system has a quantum satisfying assignment [R. Cleve…
The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for…
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle.…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
We consider a setting with agents that have preferences over alternatives and are partitioned into disjoint districts. The goal is to choose one alternative as the winner using a mechanism which first decides a representative alternative…
Many classical social choice correspondences are resolute only in the case of two alternatives and an odd number of individuals. Thus, in most cases, they admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a…