Related papers: Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a…
In a single winner election with several candidates and ranked choice or rating scale ballots, a Condorcet winner is one who wins all their two way races by majority rule or MR. A voting system has Condorcet consistency or CC if it names…
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth-telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among…
We propose a modeling framework for binary-choice dynamics in which agents update their states using two mechanisms selected based on individual preference drawn from an arbitrary distribution. We compare annealed dynamics, where…
Teddy Seidenfeld has been arguing for quite a long time that binary preference models are not powerful enough to deal with a number of crucial aspects of imprecision and indeterminacy in uncertain inference and decision making. It is at his…
Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters…
This paper introduces the axiom of Negative Dominance, stating that if a lottery $f$ is strictly preferred to a lottery $g$, then some outcome in the support of $f$ is strictly preferred to some outcome in the support of $g$. It is shown…
Condorcet's jury theorem states that the correct outcome is reached in direct majority voting systems with sufficiently large electorates as long as each voter's independent probability of voting for that outcome is greater than 0.5. Yet,…
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…
Many classical social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondences are resolute only when two alternatives and an odd number of individuals are considered. Thus, they generally admit several resolute refinements, each of them…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…
We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the…
By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (e.g., from "each member beats every non-member" to "each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement that at least one member beat every non-member"), we propose a new…
We generalize Condorcet's jury theorem (CJT) to socially connected populations in which agents revise discrete choices on a network in the presence of zealots. Free agents receive privately informative signals about the correct alternative…
Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing only limited information in the…
We study a mathematical model of voting contest with $m$ voters and $n$ candidates, with each voter ranking the candidates in order of preference, without ties. A Condorcet winner is a candidate who gets more than $m/2$ votes in pairwise…
We investigate the collective accuracy of heterogeneous agents who learn to estimate their own reliability over time and selectively abstain from voting. While classical epistemic voting results, such as the \textit{Condorcet Jury Theorem}…