Related papers: Deceptive Path Planning: A Bayesian Game Approach
This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…
We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…
Adversarial optimal transport has been proven useful as a mathematical formulation to model resource allocation problems to maximize the efficiency of transportation with an adversary, who modifies the data. It is often the case, however,…
In this work, we introduce the Deceptive Resource Allocation Game (DRAG), which studies purposeful deception within a Bayesian game framework. In DRAG, a Defender allocates resources across the true asset and several decoys to influence an…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
This article studies rational and persistent deception among intelligent robots to enhance security and operational efficiency. We present an N-player K-stage game with an asymmetric information structure where each robot's private…
Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have recently emerged as a significant security challenge for a cyber-physical system due to their stealthy, dynamic and adaptive nature. Proactive dynamic defenses provide a strategic and holistic…
Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model where each player's type parameter characterizing its own objective is private information: each player knows its own type but not its rivals' types, and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is…
We present a moving target defense strategy to reduce the impact of stealthy sensor attacks on feedback systems. The defender periodically and randomly switches between thresholds from a discrete set to increase the uncertainty for the…
In this paper, we consider a continuous-type Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in subnetwork zero-sum games, which is a generalization of deterministic subnetwork zero-sum games and discrete-type Bayesian zero-sum games. In…
In adversarial settings, a mobile agent may strategically plan its motion to influence an opponent's inference about its intended goal. We study deceptive path planning in a scenario where a mobile agent aims to reach a privately selected…
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have created new security challenges for critical infrastructures due to their stealthy, dynamic, and adaptive natures. In this work, we aim to lay a game-theoretic foundation by establishing a multi-stage…
In modern transportation networks, adversaries can manipulate routing algorithms using false data injection attacks, such as simulating heavy traffic with multiple devices running crowdsourced navigation applications, to mislead vehicles…
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…
We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…