Related papers: Quantile Peer Effect Models
We develop a model that captures peer effect heterogeneity by modeling the endogenous spillover to be linear in ordered peer outcomes. Unlike the canonical linear-in-means model, our approach accounts for the distribution of peer outcomes…
We develop a general model of discrete choice that incorporates peer effects in preferences and consideration sets. We characterize the equilibrium behavior and establish conditions under which all parts of the model can be recovered from a…
I study peer effects that arise from irreversible decisions in the absence of a standard social equilibrium. I model a latent sequence of decisions in continuous time and obtain a closed-form expression for the likelihood, which allows to…
Research on peer effects in sociology has been focused for long on social influence power to investigate the social foundations for social interactions. This paper extends Xu(2011)'s large--network--based game model by allowing for…
I introduce heterogeneity into the analysis of peer effects that arise from conformity, allowing the strength of the taste for conformity to vary across agents' actions. Using a structural model based on a simultaneous network game with…
We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…
The Linear Threshold Model is a widely used model that describes how information diffuses through a social network. According to this model, an individual adopts an idea or product after the proportion of their neighbors who have adopted it…
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
We develop a dynamic model of discrete choice that incorporates peer effects into random consideration sets. We characterize the equilibrium behavior and study the empirical content of the model. In our setup, changes in the choices of…
We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…
We obtain partial identification of direct and spillover effects in settings with strategic interaction and discrete treatments, outcome and independent instruments. We consider a framework with two decision-makers who play pure-strategy…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…
No man is an island, as individuals interact and influence one another daily in our society. When social influence takes place in experiments on a population of interconnected individuals, the treatment on a unit may affect the outcomes of…
In this work, we consider dynamic influence maximization games over social networks with multiple players (influencers). The goal of each influencer is to maximize their own reward subject to their limited total budget rate constraints.…
We study the estimation of peer effects through social networks when researchers do not observe the entire network structure. Special cases include sampled networks, censored networks, and misclassified links. We assume that researchers can…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
In this work we introduce a new model of decision-making by agents in a social network. Agents have innate preferences over the strategies but, because of the social interactions, the decision of the agents are not only affected by their…