Related papers: Propose or Vote: A Canonical Democratic Procedure
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
Collusion occurs when multiple malicious participants of a distributed protocol work together to sabotage or spy on honest participants. Decentralized protocols often rely on a subset of participants called workers for critical operations.…
We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that there is no single…
This article unpacks the design choices behind longstanding and newly proposed computational frameworks aimed at finding common grounds across collective preferences and examines their potential future impacts, both technically and…
The median voter theorem has long been the default model of voter behavior and candidate choice. While contemporary work on the distribution of political opinion has emphasized polarization and an increasing gap between the "left" and the…
Proportional representation (PR) is a fundamental principle of many democracies world-wide which employ PR-based voting rules to elect their representatives. The normative properties of these voting rules however, are often only understood…
Population protocols are a relatively novel computational model in which very resource-limited anonymous agents interact in pairs with the goal of computing predicates. We consider the probabilistic version of this model, which naturally…
The voting method, an ensemble approach for fundamental frequency estimation, is empirically known for its robustness but lacks thorough investigation. This paper provides a principled analysis and improvement of this technique. First, we…
We expect that democracy enables us to utilize collective intelligence such that our collective decisions build and enhance social welfare, and such that we accept their distributive and normative consequences. Collective decisions are…
The Pret a Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our efforts to adapt Pret a Voter to the idiosyncrasies of…
The voter model is a paradigm of ordering dynamics. At each time step, a random node is selected and copies the state of one of its neighbors. Traditionally, this state has been considered as a binary variable. Here, we relax this…
Lu and Boutilier proposed a novel approach based on "minimax regret" to use classical score based voting rules in the setting where preferences can be any partial (instead of complete) orders over the set of alternatives. We show here that…
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…
A cornerstone of social choice theory is Condorcet's paradox which says that in an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates it is possible that, no matter which candidate is declared the winner, a majority of voters would have…
Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this generalization. Here, we propose…
We investigate an iterative deliberation process for an agent community wishing to make a joint decision. We develop a general model consisting of a community of n agents, each with their initial ideal point in some metric space (X, d),…
We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery attempts, control actions---such as…
We present three voting protocols with unconditional privacy and information-theoretic correctness, without assuming any bound on the number of corrupt voters or voting authorities. All protocols have polynomial complexity and require…
Social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment is analyzed for a society composed of two cohesive groups of similar size. Within the model of random walks determined by voting, explicit formulas are derived for the capital…
We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an…