Related papers: Learning Equilibria in Matching Games with Bandit …
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…
We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game's payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these…
Consider N cooperative but non-communicating players where each plays one out of M arms for T turns. Players have different utilities for each arm, representable as an NxM matrix. These utilities are unknown to the players. In each turn…
In this paper we consider the problem of learning the optimal policy for uncontrolled restless bandit problems. In an uncontrolled restless bandit problem, there is a finite set of arms, each of which when pulled yields a positive reward.…
A natural goal in multiagent learning besides finding equilibria is to learn rationalizable behavior, where players learn to avoid iteratively dominated actions. However, even in the basic setting of multiplayer general-sum games, existing…
We study a Markov matching market involving a planner and a set of strategic agents on the two sides of the market. At each step, the agents are presented with a dynamical context, where the contexts determine the utilities. The planner…
In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee $O(1)$ regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret compared to any fixed…
In $\mathcal{X}$-armed bandit problem an agent sequentially interacts with environment which yields a reward based on the vector input the agent provides. The agent's goal is to maximise the sum of these rewards across some number of time…
We study online fair division when there are a finite number of item types and the player values for the items are drawn randomly from distributions with unknown means. In this setting, a sequence of indivisible items arrives according to a…
We consider the restless multi-armed bandit (RMAB) problem with unknown dynamics in which a player chooses M out of N arms to play at each time. The reward state of each arm transits according to an unknown Markovian rule when it is played…
We study a novel variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, where at each time step, the player observes an independently sampled context that determines the arms' mean rewards. However, playing an arm blocks it (across all contexts) for a…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…
Two-sided matching markets have been widely studied in the literature due to their rich applications. Since participants are usually uncertain about their preferences, online algorithms have recently been adopted to learn them through…
A contextual bandit problem is studied in a highly non-stationary environment, which is ubiquitous in various recommender systems due to the time-varying interests of users. Two models with disjoint and hybrid payoffs are considered to…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
Companies like Google and Microsoft run billions of auctions every day to sell advertising opportunities. Any change to the rules of these auctions can have a tremendous effect on the revenue of the company and the welfare of the…
In this paper, we provide the first investigation into adaptive combinatorial experimental design, focusing on the trade-off between regret minimization and statistical power in combinatorial multi-armed bandits (CMAB). While minimizing…
We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online based on the data observed in the…