Related papers: Non-exchangeable evolutionary and mean field games…
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of replicator dynamics but not…
Non-linear voter models assume that the opinion of an agent depends on the opinions of its neighbors in a non-linear manner. This allows for voting rules different from majority voting. While the linear voter model is known to reach…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
The replicator equation is a simple model of evolution that leads to stable form of Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). It has been studied in connection with Evolutionary Game Theory and was originally developed for…
Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…
In this work the system of agents is applied to establish a model of the nonlinear distributed signal processing. The evolution of the system of the agents - by the prediction time scale diversified trend followers, has been studied for the…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in…
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed…
Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…
We consider the general properties of the replicator dynamical system from the standpoint of its evolution and stability. Vector field analysis as well as spectral properties of such system has been studied. Lyaponuv function for…
In games with continuous strategy spaces, if a rest point of the replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable then the rest point must be finitely supported (van Veelen, M., Spreij, P., 2009. Evolution in games with a continuous action…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…