Related papers: Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with Ge…
Mechanism design is pivotal to federated learning (FL) for maximizing social welfare by coordinating self-interested clients. Existing mechanisms, however, often overlook the network effects of client participation and the diverse model…
Resource balancing within complex transportation networks is one of the most important problems in real logistics domain. Traditional solutions on these problems leverage combinatorial optimization with demand and supply forecasting.…
This paper investigates the trade-off between short-term revenue generation and long-term social welfare optimization in online food delivery platforms. We first develop a static model that captures the equilibrium interactions among…
The transition to auto-bidding in online advertising has shifted the focus of auction theory from quasi-linear utility maximization to value maximization subject to financial constraints. We study mechanism design for buyers with private…
We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…
Hierarchical multi-agent systems (HMAS) organize collections of agents into layered structures that help manage complexity and scale. These hierarchies can simplify coordination, but they also can introduce trade-offs that are not always…
We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation.
Scalable multi-agent driving simulation requires behavior models that are both realistic and computationally efficient. We address this by optimizing the behavior model that controls individual traffic participants. To improve efficiency,…
In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete…
Learning how to learn efficiently is a fundamental challenge for biological agents and a growing concern for artificial ones. To learn effectively, an agent must regulate its learning speed, balancing the benefits of rapid improvement…
Adaptive systems -- such as a biological organism gaining survival advantage, an autonomous robot executing a functional task, or a motor protein transporting intracellular nutrients -- must model the regularities and stochasticity in their…
In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical, lower reward irrespective of their actual qualities.…
This paper tackles challenges in pricing and revenue projections due to consumer uncertainty. We propose a novel data-based approach for firms facing unknown consumer type distributions. Unlike existing methods, we assume firms only observe…
How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying the application of monetary tolls to influence behavior…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic…
Resource-constrained systems are prevalent in communications. Such a system is composed of many components but only some of them can be allocated with resources such as time slots. According to the amount of information about the system,…
Composite systems are large complex systems con- sisting of interconnected agents (subsystems). Agents in a com- posite system interact with each other towards performing an in- tended goal. Controllability is essential to achieve desired…
A fundamental economic question is that of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic environments. This paper considers a simple yet compelling market model to tackle this question, where forward-looking buyers arrive at the market…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…