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Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…
We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of forbidden over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal…
We show that a competitive equilibrium always exists in combinatorial auctions with anonymous graphical valuations and pricing, using discrete geometry. This is an intuitive and easy-to-construct class of valuations that can model both…
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover, the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the…
We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the…
This paper introduces the targeted sampling model in optimal auction design. In this model, the seller may specify a quantile interval and sample from a buyer's prior restricted to the interval. This can be interpreted as allowing the…
Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, Procurement Auctions, and Wholesale Electricity Markets, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in…
Pen testing is the problem of selecting high-capacity resources when the only way to measure the capacity of a resource expends its capacity. We have a set of $n$ pens with unknown amounts of ink and our goal is to select a feasible subset…
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the…
Sponsored search positions are typically allocated through real-time auctions, where the outcomes depend on advertisers' quality-adjusted bids - the product of their bids and quality scores. Although quality scoring helps promote ads with…
The system operator's scheduling problem in electricity markets, called unit commitment, is a non-convex mixed-integer program. The optimal value function is non-convex, preventing the application of traditional marginal pricing theory to…
The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…
We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers' overall demand…
This paper analyzes individually-rational ex post equilibrium in the VC (Vickrey-Clarke) combinatorial auctions. If $\Sigma$ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids…
Developing efficient sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions is an important practical challenge in various marketing tasks. In this setting, the bidding agent obtains information, on both the value of the item at sale and the…
The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends expanding the set of allowed ad formats---to include a variety of sizes, decorations, and…
In first-price auctions for display advertising, exchanges typically communicate the "minimum-bid-to-win" to bidders after the auction as feedback for their bidding algorithms. For a winner, this is the second-highest bid, while for losing…
Cloud service providers typically provide different types of virtual machines (VMs) to cloud users with various requirements. Thanks to its effectiveness and fairness, auction has been widely applied in this heterogeneous resource…
We are interested in the problem of optimal commitments in rank-and-bid based auctions, a general class of auctions that include first price and all-pay auctions as special cases. Our main contribution is a novel approach to solve for…