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Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
We study a sequential resource allocation problem involving a fixed number of recurring jobs. At each time-step the manager should distribute available resources among the jobs in order to maximise the expected number of completed jobs.…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
The Hospital Residents problem with sizes (HRS) is a generalization of the well-studied hospital residents (HR) problem. In the HRS problem, an agent $a$ has a size $s(a)$ and the agent occupies $s(a)$ many positions of the hospital $h$…
We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting where hospitals have matroid rank valuations over the doctors,…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from…
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
When dealing with data from distinct locations, machine learning algorithms tend to demonstrate an implicit preference of some locations over the others, which constitutes biases that sabotage the spatial fairness of the algorithm. This…
Despite decades of research, SE lacks widely accepted models (that offer precise quantitative stable predictions) about what factors most influence software quality. This paper provides a promising result showing such stable models can be…
We study the problem of eliciting the preferences of a decision-maker through a moderate number of pairwise comparison queries to make them a high quality recommendation for a specific problem. We are motivated by applications in high…
Recent studies on many-to-one matching markets have explored agents with flexible capacity and truthful preference reporting, focusing on mechanisms that jointly design capacities and select a matching. However, in real-world applications…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in…
Expensive multi-objective optimization problems (EMOPs) are common in real-world scenarios where evaluating objective functions is costly and involves extensive computations or physical experiments. Current Pareto set learning methods for…
The well-known secretary problem in sequential analysis and optimal stopping theory asks one to maximize the probability of finding the optimal candidate in a sequentially examined list under the constraint that accept/reject decisions are…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Social network alignment aims at aligning person identities across social networks. Embedding based models have been shown effective for the alignment where the structural proximity preserving objective is typically adopted for the model…