Related papers: The Meta-rotation Poset for Student-Project Alloca…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number…
We consider one variant of stable assignment problems in a bipartite graph endowed with nonnegative capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices. It can be viewed as a generalization of the stable allocation problem introduced by…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
I settle the computational complexity of student-project-resource matching-allocation problems, in which students and resources are assigned to projects \citep{pc2017}. A project's capacity for students is endogenously determined by the…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
The problem of allocating students to supervisors for the development of a personal project or a dissertation is a crucial activity in the higher education environment, as it enables students to get feedback on their work from an expert and…
We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situation: consider a system where students shall be assigned to universities. There is a first round where some students apply, and a first (stable) matching $M_1$ has to be…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…