Related papers: Robust Equilibria in Shared Resource Allocation vi…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…
This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…
The $\alpha$-fair resource allocation problem has received remarkable attention and has been studied in numerous application fields. Several algorithms have been proposed in the context of $\alpha$-fair resource sharing to distributively…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…
We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…
This paper considers non-cooperative and fully-distributed power-allocation for selfish transmitter-receiver pairs in shared unlicensed spectrum when normalized-interference to each receiver is uncertain. We model each uncertain parameter…
This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral…
Athey and Segal introduced an efficient budget-balanced mechanism for a dynamic stochastic model with quasilinear payoffs and private values, using the solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show that this implementation is…
Efficient resource allocation and scheduling algorithms are essential for various distributed applications, ranging from wireless networks and cloud computing platforms to autonomous multi-agent systems and swarm robotic networks. However,…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
In bandwidth allocation, competing agents wish to transmit data along paths of links in a network, and each agent's utility is equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives among all links in her desired path. Recent market mechanisms for…
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides…
Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…
We propose a model of opinion formation on resource allocation among multiple topics by multiple agents, who are subject to hard budget constraints. We define a utility function for each agent and then derive a projected dynamical system…