Related papers: Aggregating Information and Preferences with Bound…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
Exploring the collective behavior of interacting entities is of great interest and importance. Rather than focusing on static and uniform connections, we examine the co-evolution of diverse mobile agents experiencing varying interactions…
The constrained consensus problem considered in this paper, denoted interval consensus, is characterized by the fact that each agent can impose a lower and upper bound on the achievable consensus value. Such constraints can be encoded in…
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
We present an extensive study of the joint effects of heterogeneous social agents and their heterogeneous social links in a bounded confidence opinion dynamics model. The full phase diagram of the model is explored for two different…
The original Deffuant model consists of a finite number of agents whose opinion is a number in $[0,1]$. Two socially connected agents are uniformly randomly selected at each time step and approach each other at a rate $\mu\in [0,1/2]$ if…
In linear models of consensus dynamics, the state of the various agents converges to a value which is a convex combination of the agents' initial states. We call it democratic if in the large scale limit (number of agents going to infinity)…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
In this work we introduce a new model of decision-making by agents in a social network. Agents have innate preferences over the strategies but, because of the social interactions, the decision of the agents are not only affected by their…
This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…
Spatial voting models of legislators' preferences are used in political science to test theories about their voting behavior. These models posit that legislators' ideologies as well as the ideologies reflected in votes for and against a…
This work considers the problem of resilient consensus where stochastic values of trust between agents are available. Specifically, we derive a unified mathematical framework to characterize convergence, deviation of the consensus from the…
We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein (2014)'s local dominance theory and…
A Bayesian player acting in an infinite multi-player game learns to predict the other players' strategies if his prior assigns positive probability to their play (or contains a grain of truth). Kalai and Lehrer's classic grain of truth…
We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…
We analyze the accuracy of collective decision-making in socially connected populations, where agents update binary choices through local interactions on a network. Each agent receives a private signal that is biased -- even marginally --…
To what extent can an external observer observing an equilibrium action distribution in an incomplete information game infer the underlying information structure? We investigate this issue in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. A…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
We investigate an iterative deliberation process for an agent community wishing to make a joint decision. We develop a general model consisting of a community of n agents, each with their initial ideal point in some metric space (X, d),…
We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed majority-minority game, modeling a population in which two types of heterogeneous adaptive agents, namely ``fundamentalists'' driven by differentiation and ``trend-followers''…