Related papers: Nonstationary nonzero-sum Markov games under a pro…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…
We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…
We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
In the nonzero-sum setting, we establish a connection between Nash equilibria in games of optimal stopping (Dynkin games) and generalised Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP). In the Dynkin game this reveals novel equilibria of threshold type…
We investigate mean-field games from the point of view of a large number of indistinguishable players which eventually converges to infinity. The players are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. The dynamics of the states of the…
A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…
Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…
Constrained Markov games offer a formal mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning problems where the behavior of the agents is subject to constraints. In this work, we focus on the recently introduced class of…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
In optimal stopping problems, a Markov structure guarantees Markovian optimal stopping times (first exit times). Surprisingly, there is no analogous result for Markovian stopping games once randomization is required. This paper addresses…
We investigate mean field games for players, who are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. To this end we investigate time-dependent pure jump type propagators over a finite space in the framework of non-linear Markov processes. We…
We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We extend the construction of equilibria for linear-quadratic and mean-variance portfolio problems available in the literature to a large class of mean-field time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous time. Our approach…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
We study deterministic nonstationary discrete-time optimal control problems in both finite and infinite horizon. With the aid of Gateaux differentials, we prove a discrete-time maximum principle in analogy with the well-known…
We study infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled continuous time Markov chains on a countable state space. For the discounted-cost game we prove the existence of value and…