Related papers: Stochastic Games with Limited Public Memory

This paper proves several Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators, and provides two applications to zero-sum stochastic games where the total payoff is a weighted sum of the stage payoffs. The first application is to provide…

Gameplay under various forms of uncertainty has been widely studied. Feldman et al. (2010) studied a particularly low-information setting in which one observes the opponent's actions but no payoffs, not even one's own, and introduced an…

We study Markov decision processes and turn-based stochastic games with parity conditions. There are three qualitative winning criteria, namely, sure winning, which requires all paths must satisfy the condition, almost-sure winning, which…

We show that an N-person non-cooperative semi-Markov game under limiting ratio average pay-off has a pure semi-stationary Nash equilibrium. In an earlier paper, the zero-sum two person case has been dealt with. The proof follows by reducing…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure (i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives, and investigate the existence of…

We consider the behaviour of $\lambda$-discounted zero-sum games as the discount factor $\lambda$ approaches 0 (that is, the players are more and more patient), in the context of games with stage duration. In stochastic games with stage…

We construct a statistical ensemble of games, where in each independent subensemble we have two players playing the same game. We derive the mean payoffs per move of the representative players of the game, and we evaluate all the…

This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected…

The value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can be approximated to within $\epsilon$ in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times polynomial in logarithmic in…

One-counter MDPs (OC-MDPs) and one-counter simple stochastic games (OC-SSGs) are 1-player, and 2-player turn-based zero-sum, stochastic games played on the transition graph of classic one-counter automata (equivalently, pushdown automata…

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…

Policy-based methods with function approximation are widely used for solving two-player zero-sum games with large state and/or action spaces. However, it remains elusive how to obtain optimization and statistical guarantees for such…

A new solution concept for two-player zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoff is introduced. It is based on extensions of vector orders in K-dimensional spaces to order relations in their power sets, so-called set relations, and…

Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…

This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…

Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…

We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value $V_N$ of such an $N$-stage game is of the…

Direct reciprocity based on the repeated prisoner's dilemma has been intensively studied. Most theoretical investigations have concentrated on memory-$1$ strategies, a class of elementary strategies just reacting to the previous-round…

We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the…