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We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update…
We study the role of costly information in non-cooperative two-player games when an extrinsic third party information broker is introduced asymmetrically, allowing one player to obtain information about the other player's action. This…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learners are those that do not observe the actions of other agents in the system. Due to the decentralization of information, it is challenging to design independent learners that…
We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic non-cooperative games. Given feedback laws of players that are known to be a Nash equilibrium pair for a discrete-time linear system, we…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a…
We consider team optimal control of decentralized systems with linear dynamics, quadratic costs, and arbitrary disturbance that consist of multiple sub-populations with exchangeable agents (i.e., exchanging two agents within the same…
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and robust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between teams are treated. We provide a…
This paper studies a multi-player, general-sum stochastic game characterized by a dual-stage temporal structure per period. The agents face uncertainty regarding the time-evolving state that is realized at the beginning of each period.…
We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…
In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…
We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…
It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have…
This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this…
Imperfect-information multiplayer games test whether agents can act under hidden information, sparse rewards, and non-stationary opponents. We study these challenges in Big 2, a four-player imperfect-information card game. We develop a…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
Linear-quadratic Gaussian games provide a framework for modeling strategic interactions in multi-agent systems, where agents must estimate system states from noisy observations while also making decisions to optimize a quadratic cost.…
Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
This paper presents a novel data-driven approach for approximating the $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in continuous-time linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games, where multiple agents interact with each other through their dynamics and…