Related papers: MCMC for Bayesian estimation of Differential Priva…
Membership inference attacks (MIAs) pose a critical threat to the privacy of training data in deep learning. Despite significant progress in attack methodologies, our understanding of when and how models encode membership information during…
Large capacity machine learning (ML) models are prone to membership inference attacks (MIAs), which aim to infer whether the target sample is a member of the target model's training dataset. The serious privacy concerns due to the…
A Membership Inference Attack (MIA) assesses how much a trained machine learning model reveals about its training data by determining whether specific query instances were included in the dataset. We classify existing MIAs into adaptive or…
Confidential data, such as electronic health records, activity data from wearable devices, and geolocation data, are becoming increasingly prevalent. Differential privacy provides a framework to conduct statistical analyses while mitigating…
Recent work in the privacy literature shows that sample-targeted membership inference attacks (MIAs) significantly outperform untargeted approaches by a wide margin. Motivated by this observation, we address the following question: can the…
Differential Privacy (DP) provides an elegant mathematical framework for defining a provable disclosure risk in the presence of arbitrary adversaries; it guarantees that whether an individual is in a database or not, the results of a DP…
Recent studies have shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to membership inference attacks (MIAs), which aim to infer whether a data record was used to train a target model or not. To analyze and study these vulnerabilities, various…
We develop both theory and algorithms to analyze privatized data in unbounded differential privacy (DP), where even the sample size is considered a sensitive quantity that requires privacy protection. We show that the distance between the…
Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether specific data were used to train a model. While extensively studied on classification models, their impact on time series forecasting remains largely unexplored. We address this…
Location data is frequently collected from populations and shared in aggregate form to guide policy and decision making. However, the prevalence of aggregated data also raises the privacy concern of membership inference attacks (MIAs). MIAs…
Bounding privacy leakage over compositions, i.e., privacy accounting, is a key challenge in differential privacy (DP). The privacy parameter ($\eps$ or $\delta$) is often easy to estimate but hard to bound. In this paper, we propose a new…
Implementations of the exponential mechanism in differential privacy often require sampling from intractable distributions. When approximate procedures like Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) are used, the end result incurs costs to both…
Analyzing time-series data that contains personal information, particularly in the medical field, presents serious privacy concerns. Sensitive health data from patients is often used to train machine learning models for diagnostics and…
Differential privacy (DP) is a rigorous notion of data privacy, used for private statistics. The canonical algorithm for differentially private mean estimation is to first clip the samples to a bounded range and then add noise to their…
In applications involving sensitive data, such as finance and healthcare, the necessity for preserving data privacy can be a significant barrier to machine learning model development. Differential privacy (DP) has emerged as one canonical…
Parameter estimation in statistics and system identification relies on data that may contain sensitive information. To protect this sensitive information, the notion of \emph{differential privacy} (DP) has been proposed, which enforces…
Differential privacy (DP) provides robust privacy guarantees for statistical inference, but this can lead to unreliable results and biases in downstream applications. While several noise-aware approaches have been proposed which integrate…
In Embedding-as-an-Interface (EaaI) settings, pre-trained models are queried for Intermediate Representations (IRs). The distributional properties of IRs can leak training-set membership signals, enabling Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs)…
Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) infer whether a data point is in the training data of a machine learning model. It is a threat while being in the training data is private information of a data point. MIA correctly infers some data…
Membership Inference Attacks have emerged as a dominant method for empirically measuring privacy leakage from machine learning models. Here, privacy is measured by the {\em{advantage}} or gap between a score or a function computed on the…