Related papers: Reconfiguring Proportional Committees
Much research in electoral control -- one of the most studied form of electoral attacks, in which an entity running an election alters the structure of that election to yield a preferred outcome -- has focused on giving decision complexity…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning…
We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are at least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of [Sanver,…
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
Condorcet's jury theorem states that the correct outcome is reached in direct majority voting systems with sufficiently large electorates as long as each voter's independent probability of voting for that outcome is greater than 0.5. Yet,…
In many practical scenarios, a population is divided into disjoint groups for better administration, e.g., electorates into political districts, employees into departments, students into school districts, and so on. However, grouping people…
We design a recursive measure of voting power based on partial as well as full voting efficacy. Classical measures, by contrast, incorporate solely full efficacy. We motivate our design by representing voting games using a division lattice…
In a single winner election with several candidates and ranked choice or rating scale ballots, a Condorcet winner is one who wins all their two way races by majority rule or MR. A voting system has Condorcet consistency or CC if it names…
Distributed consensus, the ability to reach agreement in the face of failures, is a fundamental primitive for constructing reliable distributed systems. The Paxos algorithm is synonymous with consensus and widely utilized in production.…
Both Schulze and ranked pairs are voting rules that satisfy many natural, desirable axioms. Many standard types of electoral control (with a chair seeking to change the outcome of an election by interfering with the election structure) have…
The executive branch, or government, is typically not elected directly by the people, but rather formed by another elected body or person such as the parliament or the president. As a result, its members are not directly accountable to the…
In real-world elections where voters cast preference ballots, voters often provide only a partial ranking of the candidates. Despite this empirical reality, prior social choice literature frequently analyzes fairness criteria under the…
Traditionally, the problem of apportioning the seats of a legislative body has been viewed as a one-shot process with no dynamic considerations. While this approach is reasonable for some settings, dynamic aspects play an important role in…
Single-round multiway join algorithms first reshuffle data over many servers and then evaluate the query at hand in a parallel and communication-free way. A key question is whether a given distribution policy for the reshuffle is adequate…
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for the desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and…
Motivated by the inapproximability of reconfiguration problems, we present a new PCP-type characterization of PSPACE, which we call a probabilistically checkable reconfiguration proof (PCRP): Any PSPACE computation can be encoded into an…
The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' populations? This--seemingly simple--task has led to a rich…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
We investigate the connections between patterns in permutations and forbidden configurations in restricted elections, first discovered by Lackner and Lackner, in order to enhance the approach initiated by the two mentioned authors. More…