Related papers: The River Method
We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at…
When each voter rates or ranks several candidates for a single office, a strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is one who beats all others in two-way races. Among 21 electoral systems examined, 18 will sometimes make candidate X the winner even if…
There is a growing need for discrete choice models that account for the complex nature of human choices, escaping traditional behavioral assumptions such as the transitivity of pairwise preferences. Recently, several parametric models of…
The paper studies information markets concerning single events from an epistemic social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections and…
The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize")…
The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
Ranked voting systems, such as instant-runoff voting (IRV) and single transferable vote (STV), are used in many places around the world. They are more complex than plurality and scoring rules, presenting a challenge for auditing their…
A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable…
This paper is a brief and informal presentation of cirquent calculus, a novel proof system for resource-conscious logics. As such, it is a refinement of sequent calculus with mechanisms that allow to explicitly account for the possibility…
By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to which different voting methods are more or less resistant to…
The manuscript introduces a method to select a random sample from a stream by deciding on each sampling unit immediately after observing it. The process could be applied to unequal as well as equal probability sampling. The implementation…
A method is given for determining a mixed social choice out of a paired-comparison matrix. The method combines a projection procedure introduced in previous papers of the same authors and a classical method due to Zermelo. The resulting…
We develop a novel, fundamental and surprisingly simple randomized iterative method for solving consistent linear systems. Our method has six different but equivalent interpretations: sketch-and-project, constrain-and-approximate, random…
We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…
This article describes a new family of cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators, based on coupled chaotic maps, that will serve as keystream in a stream cipher. The maps are a modification of a piecewise linear map, by…
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study an asymmetric setting where voters face varying…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…
We introduce Categorical Flow Maps, a flow-matching method for accelerated few-step generation of categorical data via self-distillation. Building on recent variational formulations of flow matching and the broader trend towards accelerated…