Related papers: Computing Equilibria in Stochastic Nonconvex and N…

No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

This paper develops a non-parametric test for consistency of players' behavior in a series of games with the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). The test exploits a characterization of the equilibrium choice probabilities in any structural…

We address learning Nash equilibria in convex games under the payoff information setting. We consider the case in which the game pseudo-gradient is monotone but not necessarily strictly monotone. This relaxation of strict monotonicity…

We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…

Zero-sum Linear Quadratic (LQ) games are fundamental in optimal control and can be used (i)~as a dynamic game formulation for risk-sensitive or robust control and (ii)~as a benchmark setting for multi-agent reinforcement learning with two…

Large-scale optimization problems require algorithms both effective and efficient. One such popular and proven algorithm is Stochastic Gradient Descent which uses first-order gradient information to solve these problems. This paper studies…

In noncooperative Nash games, equilibria are often inefficient. This is exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma and was first provably shown in the 1980s. Since then, understanding the quality of Nash equilibrium (NE) received considerable…

In this paper we study the problem of exact recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set of a graphical game from noisy observations of joint actions of the players alone. We consider sparse linear influence games --- a…

We explore the use of policy approximations to reduce the computational cost of learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games. We propose a new Q-learning type algorithm that uses a sequence of entropy-regularized soft policies to…

Stochastic nonconvex optimization problems with nonlinear constraints have a broad range of applications in intelligent transportation, cyber-security, and smart grids. In this paper, first, we propose an inexact-proximal accelerated…

Computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games in classical and quantum settings is extensively studied. For general-sum games, computing Nash equilibria is PPAD-hard and the computing of a more general concept called correlated equilibria has…

A major challenge in multi-agent systems is that the system complexity grows dramatically with the number of agents as well as the size of their action spaces, which is typical in real world scenarios such as autonomous vehicles, robotic…

In this paper, a novel stochastic extra-step quasi-Newton method is developed to solve a class of nonsmooth nonconvex composite optimization problems. We assume that the gradient of the smooth part of the objective function can only be…

We introduce Cut-and-Play, a practically-efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in simultaneous non-cooperative games where players decide via nonconvex and possibly unbounded optimization problems with separable payoff…

In this paper, we consider stochastic monotone Nash games where each player's strategy set is characterized by possibly a large number of explicit convex constraint inequalities. Notably, the functional constraints of each player may depend…

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…

Two of the most prominent algorithms for solving unconstrained smooth games are the classical stochastic gradient descent-ascent (SGDA) and the recently introduced stochastic consensus optimization (SCO) [Mescheder et al., 2017]. SGDA is…

Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…