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Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive…
We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and…
We study offline dynamic pricing when historical data provide incomplete coverage of the price space such that some candidate prices, including the optimal one, may be entirely unobserved. This setting is common in practice and is…
We consider a general class of high-volume, fast-moving production-inventory systems based on both lost-sales and backorder inventory models. Such systems require a fundamental understanding of the asymptotic behavior of key performance…
In this paper, we discuss incentive design for hierarchical model predictive control (MPC) systems viewed as Stackelberg games. We consider a hierarchical MPC formulation where, given a lower-level convex MPC (LoMPC), the upper-level system…
Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a…
This paper introduces a differentially private mechanism to protect the information exchanged during the coordination of the sequential market-clearing of electricity and natural gas systems. The coordination between these sequential and…
We study deregulated power markets with strategic power suppliers. In deregulated markets, each supplier submits its supply function (i.e., the amount of electricity it is willing to produce at various prices) to the independent system…
Data is the new oil; this refrain is repeated extensively in the age of internet tracking, machine learning, and data analytics. Social network analysis, cookie-based advertising, and government surveillance are all evidence of the use of…
We develop a stochastic equilibrium model for an electricity market with asymmetric renewable energy forecasts. In our setting, market participants optimize their profits using public information about a conditional expectation of energy…
When reasoning about the strategic capabilities of an agent, it is important to consider the nature of its adversaries. In the particular context of controller synthesis for quantitative specifications, the usual problem is to devise a…
The use of dynamic pricing by profit-maximizing firms gives rise to demand fairness concerns, measured by discrepancies in consumer groups' demand responses to a given pricing strategy. Notably, dynamic pricing may result in buyer…
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…
In settings where ML models are used to inform the allocation of resources, agents affected by the allocation decisions might have an incentive to strategically change their features to secure better outcomes. While prior work has studied…
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…
We present a model of price formation in an inelastic market whose dynamics are partially driven by both money flows and their impact on asset prices. The money flow to the market is viewed as an investment policy of outside investors. For…
The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic framework that takes into account the interdependent…
By utilizing tools from game theory, we develop a novel multi-period-multi-company demand response framework considering the interactions between companies (sellers of energy) and their consumers (buyers of energy). We model the…
We model competition on a credence goods market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the aggregate…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…