Related papers: EXAM: Exploiting Exclusive System-Level Cache in A…
This paper argues and shows that speculative vectorization, where a loop with rare or unknown memory dependencies are still vectorized, is fundamentally vulnerable and cannot be mitigated by existing defenses. We implement a simple proof of…
Modern multi-core processors share cache resources for maximum cache utilization and performance gains. However, this leaves the cache vulnerable to side-channel attacks, where timing differences in shared cache behavior are exploited to…
Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause…
Network slicing in 5G and the future 6G networks will enable the creation of multiple virtualized networks on a shared physical infrastructure. This innovative approach enables the provision of tailored networks to accommodate specific…
Microarchitectural attacks on CPU structures have been studied in native applications, as well as in web browsers. These attacks continue to be a substantial threat to computing systems at all scales. With the proliferation of heterogeneous…
Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack…
Large language models (LLMs) possess extensive knowledge and question-answering capabilities, having been widely deployed in privacy-sensitive domains like finance and medical consultation. During LLM inferences, cache-sharing methods are…
Randomized, skewed caches (RSCs) such as CEASER-S have recently received much attention to defend against contention-based cache side channels. By randomizing and regularly changing the mapping(s) of addresses to cache sets, these…
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high resolution and generic cross-core leakage even with simple…
The ever increasing popularity and availability of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) had a stark influence on microarchitectural attack research in academia, as their strong attacker model both boosts existing attack vectors and…
With growing popularity, deep learning (DL) models are becoming larger-scale, and only the companies with vast training datasets and immense computing power can manage their business serving such large models. Most of those DL models are…
In a zero-trust fabless paradigm, designers are increasingly concerned about hardware-based attacks on the semiconductor supply chain. Logic locking is a design-for-trust method that adds extra key-controlled gates in the circuits to…
As real-world images come in varying sizes, the machine learning model is part of a larger system that includes an upstream image scaling algorithm. In this paper, we investigate the interplay between vulnerabilities of the image scaling…
Micro-architectural attacks use information leaked through shared resources to break hardware-enforced isolation. These attacks have been used to steal private information ranging from cryptographic keys to privileged Operating System (OS)…
Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a…
Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-channel…
We propose a framework for the design and optimization of a secure self-optimizing, self-adapting system-on-chip (S4oC) architecture. The goal is to minimize the impact of attacks such as hardware Trojan and side-channel, by making…
Parallel programming is emerging fast and intensive applications need more resources, so there is a huge demand for on-chip multiprocessors. Accessing L1 caches beside the cores are the fastest after registers but the size of private caches…
Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-Time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing attacks. These techniques engineer the memory accesses of…
Stack-based memory corruption vulnerabilities have long been exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code or perform unauthorized memory operations. Various defense mechanisms have been introduced to mitigate stack memory errors, but…