Related papers: Robust Aggregation of Preferences
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice…
This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature…
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof…
From an inconsistent database non-trivial arguments may be constructed both for a proposition, and for the contrary of that proposition. Therefore, inconsistency in a logical database causes uncertainty about which conclusions to accept.…
The belief revision field is opulent in new proposals and indigent in analyses of existing approaches. Much work hinge on postulates, employed as syntactic characterizations: some revision mechanism is equivalent to some properties.…
The well-studied problem of statistical rank aggregation has been applied to comparing sports teams, information retrieval, and most recently to data generated by human judgment. Such human-generated rankings may be substantially different…
This study proposes a new efficiency requirement, a minimal almost weak Pareto principle, which says that x is socially better than y whenever the only one individual never prefers y to x, and all the others prefers x to y. Then, I show…
We study the subtlety of optimal paternalism when a utilitarian planner has the power to design a discrete choice set for a heterogeneous population with bounded rationality. We first consider the planning problem in abstraction. We show…
Belief dynamics are fundamental to human behavior and social coordination. Individuals rely on accurate beliefs to make decisions, and shared beliefs form the basis of successful cooperation. Traditional studies often examined beliefs in…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
This paper revisits the classic instrument choice problem in a setting with consumption externalities, through the lens of robust mechanism design. A regulator can implement any incentive-compatible policy but is uncertain about how…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about…
We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying "true" preference. Our conditions are weak, and therefore valid in a wide range of economic environments.…
Commutativity is a normative criterion of aggregation and updating stating that the aggregation of expert posteriors should be identical to the update of the aggregated priors. I propose a thought experiment that raises questions about the…
Reliability (survival analysis, to biostatisticians) is a key ingredient for mak- ing decisions that mitigate the risk of failure. The other key ingredient is utility. A decision theoretic framework harnesses the two, but to invoke this…
We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected…
This paper studies preference aggregation under risk. In our model, each agent has an incomplete preference relation represented by a set of expected utility functions. The classical Pareto principle is silent on agreement involving…
We consider methods for aggregating preferences that are based on the resolution of discrete optimization problems. The preferences are represented by arbitrary binary relations (possibly weighted) or incomplete paired comparison matrices.…