Related papers: Competitive Information Disclosure with Heterogene…
We study how increasing competition, by making prizes more unequal, affects effort in contests. In a finite type-space environment, we characterize the equilibrium, analyze the effect of competition under linear costs, and identify…
We study the role of costly information in non-cooperative two-player games when an extrinsic third party information broker is introduced asymmetrically, allowing one player to obtain information about the other player's action. This…
Building on the generalized hedonic-linear model of Pellegrino (2025), this paper studies optimal product differentiation when a representative consumer has preferences over product characteristics. Under multiproduct monopoly, the…
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…
Human attention has become a scarce and strategically contested resource in digital environments. Content providers increasingly engage in excessive competition for visibility, often prioritizing attention-grabbing tactics over substantive…
We study the effects of endogenous cost formation in the classic Cournot oligopoly through an extended two-stage game. The competing Cournot firms produce low-cost but limited quantities of a single homogeneous product. For additional…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
Consumers only discover at the first seller which product best fits their needs, then check its price online, then decide on buying. Switching sellers is costly. Equilibrium prices fall in the switching cost, eventually to the monopoly…
We study a continuous time economy where throughout time, insiders receive private signals regarding the risky assets' terminal payoff. We prove existence of a partial communication equilibrium where, at each private signal time, the public…
When online sellers use AI learning algorithms to automatically compete on e-commerce platforms, there is concern that they will learn to coordinate on higher than competitive prices. However, this concern was primarily raised in…
Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…
This paper develops a theoretical model of platform competition where user-generated content (UGC) quality arises endogenously from the composition of the user base. Users differ in their relative preferences for content quality and network…
This paper explains four things in a unified way. First, how e-commerce can generate price equilibria where physical shops either compete with virtual shops for consumers with Internet access, or alternatively, sell only to consumers with…
A general information equilibrium model in the case of ideal information transfer is defined and then used to derive the relationship between supply (information destination) and demand (information source) with the price as the detector of…
We study deterministic monopoly pricing under partial knowledge of the market, where the seller has access only to summary statistics of the valuation distribution, such as the mean, dispersion, and maximum value. Using tools from…
We study a general problem of allocating limited resources to heterogeneous customers over time under model uncertainty. Each type of customer can be serviced using different actions, each of which stochastically consumes some combination…
Two-sided marketplaces embody heterogeneity in incentives: producers seek exposure while consumers seek relevance, and balancing these competing objectives through constrained optimization is now a standard practice. Yet real platforms face…
In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model by assuming that traders face not only asymmetric information but also heterogenous prior beliefs, under the requirement that the insider publicly disclose his stock trades after the…
We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable (or parity) and totally symmetric Boolean securities in distributed information market. We theoretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common prior…
We study one-shot Nash competition between an arbitrary number of identical dealers that compete for the order flow of a client. The client trades either because of proprietary information, exposure to idiosyncratic risk, or a mix of both…