Related papers: Bayesian eco-evolutionary game dynamics
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…
We explore the state of information disruption caused by the cocktail party effect within the framework of non-perfect information games and evolutive games with multiple werewolves. In particular, we mathematically model and analyze the…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
Evolutionary games on graphs describe how strategic interactions and population structure determine evolutionary success, quantified by the probability that a single mutant takes over a population. Graph structures, compared to the…
A stochastic model for behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals is developed. `Microscopic' assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations.…
Global games form a subclass of games with incomplete information where a set of agents decide actions against a regime with an underlying fundamental $\theta$ representing its power. Each agent has access to an independent noisy…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study…
Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a…
Classical results of Decision Theory, and its extension to a multi-agent setting: Game Theory, operate only at the associative level of information; this is, classical decision makers only take into account probabilities of events; we go…
When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
We analyze the problem of distributed power allocation for orthogonal multiple access channels by considering a continuous non-cooperative game whose strategy space represents the users' distribution of transmission power over the network's…