Related papers: Systemic Risk and Default Cascades in Global Equit…
This study extends the Gai-Kapadia framework, originally developed for interbank contagion, to assess systemic risk and default cascades in global equity markets. We analyze a 30 asset network comprising Brazilian and developed market…
The aim of this paper is to quantify and manage systemic risk caused by default contagion in the interbank market. We model the market as a random directed network, where the vertices represent financial institutions and the weighted edges…
In this work we provide a simple setting that connects the structural modelling approach of Gai-Kapadia interbank networks with the mean-field approach to default contagion. To accomplish this we make two key contributions. First, we…
We consider a general tractable model for default contagion and systemic risk in a heterogeneous financial network, subject to an exogenous macroeconomic shock. We show that, under some regularity assumptions, the default cascade model…
We introduce a general framework for models of cascade and contagion processes on networks, to identify their commonalities and differences. In particular, models of social and financial cascades, as well as the fiber bundle model, the…
The scope of financial systemic risk research encompasses a wide range of interbank channels and effects, including asset correlation shocks, default contagion, illiquidity contagion, and asset fire sales. This paper introduces a financial…
A probabilistic framework is introduced that represents stylized banking networks and aims to predict the size of contagion events. In contrast to previous work on random financial networks, which assumes independent connections between…
We analyze cascades of defaults in an interbank loan market. The novel feature of this study is that the network structure and the size distribution of banks are derived from empirical data. We find that the ability of a defaulted…
We introduce a probabilistic framework that represents stylized banking networks with the aim of predicting the size of contagion events. Most previous work on random financial networks assumes independent connections between banks, whereas…
This systemic risk paper introduces inhomogeneous random financial networks (IRFNs). Such models are intended to describe parts, or the entirety, of a highly heterogeneous network of banks and their interconnections, in the global financial…
We propose a generic system model for a special category of interdependent networks, demand-supply networks, in which the demand and the supply nodes are associated with heterogeneous loads and resources, respectively. Our model sheds a…
We study systemic default contagion in sparse financial networks and develop a framework for deciding when aggregate exposure matrices are reliable and when node-level network information changes tail risk and control design. The first…
In this paper, we propose a dynamical model to capture cascading failures among interconnected organizations in the global financial system. Failures can take the form of bankruptcies, defaults, and other insolvencies. The network that…
The increasing complexity of cascading risks in urban systems necessitates robust, data-driven frameworks to model interdependencies across multiple domains. This study presents a foundational Bayesian network-based approach for analyzing…
As economic entities become increasingly interconnected, a shock in a financial network can provoke significant cascading failures throughout the system. To study the systemic risk of financial systems, we create a bi-partite banking…
I show the equivalence between a model of financial contagion and the threshold model of global cascades proposed by Watts (2002). The model financial network comprises banks that hold risky external assets as well as interbank assets. It…
Cross-border equity and long-term debt securities portfolio investment networks are analysed from 2002 to 2012, covering the 2008 global financial crisis. They serve as network-proxies for measuring the robustness of the global financial…
Global catastrophic risk events, such as nuclear war, pose a severe threat to the stability of international financial systems. As evidenced by even less severe scenarios like the Great Recession, an economic failure can propagate through…
The interconnectedness of financial institutions affects instability and credit crises. To quantify systemic risk we introduce here the PD model, a dynamic model that combines credit risk techniques with a contagion mechanism on the network…
Complex non-linear interactions between banks and assets we model by two time-dependent Erd\H{o}s Renyi network models where each node, representing bank, can invest either to a single asset (model I) or multiple assets (model II). We use…