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The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…
While many theoretical studies have revealed the strategies that could lead to and maintain cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, less is known about what human participants actually do in this game and how strategies change when…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
We highlight that match fixed effects, represented by the coefficients of interaction terms involving dummy variables for two elements, lack identification without specific restrictions on parameters. Consequently, the coefficients…
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which guarantees that the two sides be treated symmetrically. All…
We consider equilibrium one-on-one conversations between neighbors on a circular table, with the goal of assessing the likelihood of a (perhaps) familiar situation: sitting at a table where both of your neighbors are talking to someone…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of providing a bipartite matching between n " boys " and n " girls "-each of whom have a totally ordered preference list over the other set-such that there exists no…
The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed. We find counterevidence to this assumption in a quasi-experiment. In Germany's…
Distributed control increases system scalability, flexibility, and redundancy. Foundational to such decentralisation is consensus formation, by which decision-making and coordination are achieved. However, decentralised multi-agent systems…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others'…
Colloquially, there are two groups, $n$ men and $n$ women, each man (woman) ranking women (men) as potential marriage partners. A complete matching is called stable if no unmatched pair prefer each other to their partners in the matching.…
The Holy Grail of a decentralised stablecoin is achieved on rigorous mathematical frameworks, obtaining multiple advantageous proofs: stability, convergence, truthfulness, faithfulness, and malicious-security. These properties could only be…