Related papers: Iterative VCG-based Mechanism Fosters Cooperation …
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e., maximise social utility) and individually rational…
This paper introduces the theoretical framework for combining Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms with the Consensus Planning Protocol (CPP) to enable truthful and efficient collaboration between a retailer and vendors to lower joint…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the…
In industrial scenarios involving multi-agent collective decision-making, centralized decision-making may not be admissible due to restrictive access to individual local information, while the conflicts between participants' self-interest…
Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for designing distributed optimization algorithms for large-scale networks. An economic challenge arises in the presence of strategic agents' private information. Existing studies…
To ensure security in data transmission is one of the most important issues for wireless relay networks, and physical layer security is an attractive alternative solution to address this issue. In this paper, we consider a cooperative…
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system…
We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement…
In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used…
We consider minimizing a sum of agent-specific nondifferentiable merely convex functions over the solution set of a variational inequality (VI) problem in that each agent is associated with a local monotone mapping. This problem finds an…
Proper functioning of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) is crucial for the safety and efficiency of future intelligent transport systems. Meanwhile, transitioning to fully autonomous driving requires a long period of mixed autonomy…
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is necessary to design mechanisms (collective…
Autonomous driving has entered the testing phase, but due to the limited decision-making capabilities of individual vehicle algorithms, safety and efficiency issues have become more apparent in complex scenarios. With the advancement of…
Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system.…
We study the problem of allocating Electric Vehicles (EVs) to charging stations and scheduling their charging. We develop offline and online solutions that treat EV users as self-interested agents that aim to maximise their profit and…
In this paper, we are concerned with the automated exchange of orders between logistics companies in a marketplace platform to optimize total revenues. We introduce a novel multi-agent approach to this problem, focusing on the Collaborative…
While the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ensures incentive compatibility for a static one-shot game, it does not appear to be feasible to construct a dominant truth-telling mechanism for agents that are stochastic dynamic systems.…
Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design rules of interaction for economic transactions that will,in principle, yield some de- sired outcome. In the last few years this field has received much interest of…
We propose a physics-grounded mechanism design for dynamic spectrum sharing that bridges the gap between radiometric retrieval constraints and economic incentives. We formulate the active and passive users coexistence problem as a…