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Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment, e.g. a driver deciding what route to drive to work every day. While regret…
This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…
In adversarial multi-armed bandits, two performance measures are commonly used: static regret, which compares the learner to the best fixed arm, and dynamic regret, which compares it to the best sequence of arms. While optimal algorithms…
In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…
Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…
In this paper, a new method is proposed to compute the rolling Nash equilibrium of the time-invariant nonlinear two-person zero-sum differential games. The idea is to discretize the time to transform a differential game into a sequential…
Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…
We consider a family of learning strategies for online optimization problems that evolve in continuous time and we show that they lead to no regret. From a more traditional, discrete-time viewpoint, this continuous-time approach allows us…
In this paper we establish efficient and \emph{uncoupled} learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in a general-sum multiplayer game, the \emph{swap regret} of each player after $T$ repetitions of the game is bounded by…
The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…
Online learning and model reference adaptive control have many interesting intersections. One area where they differ however is in how the algorithms are analyzed and what objective or metric is used to discriminate "good" algorithms from…
Non-stationary online learning has drawn much attention in recent years. Despite considerable progress, dynamic regret minimization has primarily focused on convex functions, leaving the functions with stronger curvature (e.g., squared or…
This work focuses on the setting of dynamic regret in the context of online learning with full information. In particular, we analyze regret bounds with respect to the temporal variability of the loss functions. By assuming that the…
We study bandit learning in matching markets, where players and arms constitute the two market sides, and the players' utilities are linear in the arm contexts. In each round, new arms arrive with observable contexts. Then, the algorithm…
We study the problem of \emph{dynamic regret minimization} in $K$-armed Dueling Bandits under non-stationary or time varying preferences. This is an online learning setup where the agent chooses a pair of items at each round and observes…
We study the problem of dynamic regret minimization in online convex optimization, in which the objective is to minimize the difference between the cumulative loss of an algorithm and that of an arbitrary sequence of comparators. While the…
We study a class of adversarial bandit optimization problems in which the loss functions may be non-convex and non-smooth. In each round, the learner observes a loss that consists of an underlying linear component together with an…
Considering a class of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms in non-cooperative settings, we provide local convergence guarantees to a neighborhood of a stable local Nash equilibrium. In particular, we consider continuous games…
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in…
We suggest a general method for inferring players' values from their actions in repeated games. The method extends and improves upon the recent suggestion of (Nekipelov et al., EC 2015) and is based on the assumption that players are more…