Related papers: Entry and disclosure in group contests
When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors one group over another. The former group faces incentives to invest in becoming productive, while the latter is discouraged from…
In Private Set Intersection protocols (PSIs), a non-empty result always reveals something about the private input sets of the parties. Moreover, in various variants of PSI, not all parties necessarily receive or are interested in the…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that…
As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly integrates into crowdfunding practices, strategic disclosure of AI involvement has become critical. Yet, empirical insights into how different disclosure strategies influence investor decisions…
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but…
In congestion games, users make myopic routing decisions to jam each other, and the social planner with the full information designs mechanisms on information or payment side to regulate. However, it is difficult to obtain time-varying…
The availability of vast amounts of data is changing how we can make medical discoveries, predict global market trends, save energy, and develop educational strategies. In some settings such as Genome Wide Association Studies or deep…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
Interacting agents receive public information at no cost and flexibly acquire private information at a cost proportional to entropy reduction. When a policymaker provides more public information, agents acquire less private information,…
Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort, but also their incentives to gather information to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between…
We present a mathematical framework for modeling two-player noncooperative games in which one player is uncertain of the other player's costs but can preemptively allocate information-gathering resources to reduce this uncertainty. We refer…
Let us consider two companies A and B. Both of them are interested in buying a set of some goods. The company A is a big corporation and it knows the actual value of the good on the market and is able to observe the previous values of them.…
Data integration systems allow users to access data sitting in multiple sources by means of queries over a global schema, related to the sources via mappings. Data sources often contain sensitive information, and thus an analysis is needed…
We present a novel methodology for identifying public knowledge and eliminating the biases it creates when aggregating information in small group settings. A two stage mechanism consisting of an information market and a coordination game is…
Consider a two-person zero-sum search game between a hider and a searcher. The hider hides among $n$ discrete locations, and the searcher successively visits individual locations until finding the hider. Known to both players, a search at…
In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the signal of the firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset. The fundamental value itself is…
Involution now refers to the phenomenon that competitors in the same field make more efforts to struggle for limited resources but get lower individual ''profit effort ratio''. In this work, we investigate the evolution of the involution…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…