Related papers: Entry and disclosure in group contests
A policymaker discloses public information to interacting agents who also acquire costly private information. More precise public information reduces the precision and cost of acquired private information. Considering this effect, what…
Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…
Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-making policies is a level of unpredictability, or randomness,…
Although companies are exhorted to provide more information to the financial community, it is evident that they choose different paths based upon their strategic emphasis and competitive environments. Our investigation explores the…
The amount of personal information contributed by individuals to digital repositories such as social network sites has grown substantially. The existence of this data offers unprecedented opportunities for data analytics research in various…
We investigate investors voluntary disclosure decisions under uncertainty about their information endowment (Dye 1985). In our model, an investor may receive initial evidence about a target firm. Conditional on learning the initial…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…
A digital goods auction is a type of auction where potential buyers bid the maximal price that they are willing to pay for a certain item, which a seller can produce at a negligible cost and in unlimited quantity. To maximise her benefits,…
We study an all-pay contest in which players with low abilities are filtered out before competing for prizes. We consider a setting where the designer admits a certain number of top players. The admitted players update their beliefs based…
In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective…
Motivated by the rapid push to decentralize sharing of data, we study whether large-scale data sharing coalitions can form in a decentralized manner under differential privacy when players have heterogeneous privacy preferences. We first…
Information sharing between individuals is crucial to improve performance in collective tasks. However, in a competitive world, individuals may be reluctant to share information with the others, and it is still unclear how the presence of…
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…
We study a model of dynamic two-stage R&D competition where the competing firms are uncertain about the difficulty of the first stage. Staying in the competition is costly and a firm can also choose whether and when to quit. When a firm…
The plethora of comparison shopping agents (CSAs) in today's markets enables buyers to query more than a single CSA when shopping, and an inter-CSAs competition naturally arises. We suggest a new approach, termed "selective price…
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence.…
In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical, lower reward irrespective of their actual qualities.…