Related papers: Verifying Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Probabilist…
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
The problems of \emph{verification} and \emph{realizability} are two central themes in the analysis of reactive systems. When multiagent systems are considered, these problems have natural analogues of existence (nonemptiness) of…
The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as stochastic games. While algorithms have been developed for…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-information games where search starts from the current state,…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
A major open question in algorithmic game theory is whether normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCE) can be computed efficiently in succinct games such as extensive-form games [DFF+25,6PR24,FP23,HvS08,VSF08,PR08]. Motivated by this…
We study two natural problems about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: checking problems, that consist in deciding whether a strategy profile, defined by a Mealy machine, is…
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…
Computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-player non-zerosum stochastic games is a formidable challenge. Currently, algorithmic methods in stochastic game theory are unable to compute NE for stochastic games (SGs) for settings in all but…
In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…
A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…
We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available…
Studying Nash dynamics is an important approach for analyzing the outcome of games with repeated selfish behavior of self-interested agents. Sink equilibria has been introduced by Goemans, Mirrokni, and Vetta for studying social cost on…
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…