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In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…

In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…

We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks, and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we…

Designing resilient control strategies for mitigating stealthy attacks is a crucial task in emerging cyber-physical systems. In the design of anomaly detectors, it is common to assume Gaussian noise models to maintain tractability; however,…

In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…

In this paper, we propose an effective and easily deployable approach to detect the presence of stealthy sensor attacks in industrial control systems, where (legacy) control devices critically rely on accurate (and usually non-encrypted)…

The increase in network connectivity has also resulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems. An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely affect control performance by tampering with sensor…

This paper investigates the vulnerability of discrete-time linear time-invariant systems to stealthy sensor attacks during the learning phase. In particular, we demonstrate that a {data-driven} adversary, without access to the system model,…

Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and…

This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…

Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…

We study how to secure distributed filters for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noise under false-data injection attacks. A malicious attacker is able to arbitrarily manipulate the observations for a time-varying and unknown…

This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…

Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain the power system operating in a secure and efficient state. The recently identified coordinated data injection attacks to meter measurements can bypass the current security…

We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…

Safety filters ensure that only safe control actions are executed. We propose a simple and stealthy false-data injection attack for deactivating such safety filters; in particular, we focus on deactivating safety filters that are based on…

This work considers the problem of designing an attack strategy on remote state estimation under the condition of strict stealthiness and $\epsilon$-stealthiness of the attack. An attacker is assumed to be able to launch a linear attack to…

This paper addresses the problem of distributed resilient state estimation and control for linear time-invariant systems in the presence of malicious false data injection sensor attacks and bounded noise. We consider a system operator…