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Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
Most industry-standard generative AIs and feature encoders are proprietary, offering only black-box access: their outputs are observable, but their internal parameters and architectures remain hidden from the end-user. This black-box access…
Stochastic games provide a framework for interactions among multiple agents and enable a myriad of applications. In these games, agents decide on actions simultaneously, the state of every agent moves to the next state, and each agent…
The majority of distributed learning literature focuses on convergence to Nash equilibria. Correlated equilibria, on the other hand, can often characterize more efficient collective behavior than even the best Nash equilibrium. However,…
We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…
In the modern age of large-scale AI, federated learning has become an increasingly important tool for training large populations of AI agents; however, its computational and communication costs can rapidly fail to scale with the number of…
Federated learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that allows multiple clients to jointly train a shared model while maintaining data privacy. Despite its great potential for domains with strict data privacy requirements, the…
Federated learning protects users' data privacy through sharing users' local model parameters (instead of raw data) with a server. However, when massive users train a large machine learning model through federated learning, the dynamically…
Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with…
Federated Learning is an emerging learning paradigm that allows training models from samples distributed across a large network of clients while respecting privacy and communication restrictions. Despite its success, federated learning…
Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
Federated learning involves training machine learning models over devices or data silos, such as edge processors or data warehouses, while keeping the data local. Training in heterogeneous and potentially massive networks introduces bias…
In this work we introduce a new model of decision-making by agents in a social network. Agents have innate preferences over the strategies but, because of the social interactions, the decision of the agents are not only affected by their…
We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization…
Multi-agent games in dynamic nonlinear settings are challenging due to the time-varying interactions among the agents and the non-stationarity of the (potential) Nash equilibria. In this paper we consider model-free games, where agent…
The significance of network structures in promoting group cooperation within social dilemmas has been widely recognized. Prior studies attribute this facilitation to the assortment of strategies driven by spatial interactions. Although…
Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly…
In an infinitely repeated general-sum pricing game, independent reinforcement learners may exhibit collusive behavior without any communication, raising concerns about algorithmic collusion. To better understand the learning dynamics, we…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…