Related papers: Randomization in Optimal Execution Games
Trading algorithms that execute large orders are susceptible to exploitation by order anticipation strategies. This paper studies the influence of order anticipation strategies in a multi-investor model of optimal execution under transient…
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…
We study $N$-player optimal execution games in an Obizhaeva--Wang model of transient price impact. When the game is regularized by an instantaneous cost on the trading rate, a unique equilibrium exists and we derive its closed form. Whereas…
We consider a market impact game for $n$ risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a…
We build on an emerging line of work which studies strategic manipulations in training data provided to machine learning algorithms. Specifically, we focus on the ubiquitous task of linear regression. Prior work focused on the design of…
We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price impacts. Moreover,…
We study the high-frequency limits of strategies and costs in a Nash equilibrium for two agents that are competing to minimize liquidation costs in a discrete-time market impact model with exponentially decaying price impact and quadratic…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
We consider a Nash equilibrium between two high-frequency traders in a simple market impact model with transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs. Extending a result by Sch\"oneborn (2008), we prove existence and…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
A large body of empirical literature has shown that market impact of financial prices is transient. However, from a theoretical standpoint, the origin of this temporary nature is still unclear. We show that an implied transient impact…
We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…
We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…
We study the high-frequency limit of an $n$-trader optimal execution game in discrete time. Traders face transient price impact of Obizhaeva--Wang type in addition to quadratic instantaneous trading costs $\theta(\Delta X_t)^2$ on each…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…