Related papers: Evolutionary Prediction Games
It is known that learning of players who interact in a repeated game can be interpreted as an evolutionary process in a population of ideas. These analogies have so far mostly been established in deterministic models, and memory loss in…
Widespread deployment of societal-scale machine learning systems necessitates a thorough understanding of the resulting long-term effects these systems have on their environment, including loss of trustworthiness, bias amplification, and…
The serious games between humans and AI have only just begun. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) models the competitive and cooperative strategies of biological entities. EGT could help predict the potential evolutionary equilibrium of humans…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows to introduce elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo}…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between…
The paper studies the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in populations of agents who interact among themselves in Prisoner's Dilemma games and who are allowed to choose their partners. The population is then subject to…
Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change of environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have…
We establish a theoretical framework to address evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection. As the selection intensity tends to infinity, strategy competition unfolds in the deterministic way of winners taking all. We…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
We propose a new framework for imitation learning -- treating imitation as a two-player ranking-based game between a policy and a reward. In this game, the reward agent learns to satisfy pairwise performance rankings between behaviors,…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here,…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…