Related papers: Succinct Ambiguous Contracts
In this paper we provide a theoretical analysis of Variable Annuities with a focus on the holder's right to an early termination of the contract. We obtain a rigorous pricing formula and the optimal exercise boundary for the surrender…
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in which the public outsources the construction and the maintenance of an equipment (hospital, university, prison...). One drawback of this contract is…
We consider a general formulation of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem with a continuous payment and a lump-sum payment at termination. In the European version of the problem, the random horizon is chosen solely by the principal…
We study a moral hazard problem with adverse selection: a risk-neutral agent can directly control the output distribution and possess private information about the production environment. The principal designs a menu of contracts satisfying…
Many researchers in artificial intelligence are beginning to explore the use of soft constraints to express a set of (possibly conflicting) problem requirements. A soft constraint is a function defined on a collection of variables which…
The standard algorithm for higher-order contract checking can lead to unbounded space consumption and can destroy tail recursion, altering a program's asymptotic space complexity. While space efficiency for gradual types---contracts…
Dybvig (1988a,b) solves in a complete market setting the problem of finding a payoff that is cheapest possible in reaching a given target distribution ("cost-efficient payoff"). In the presence of ambiguity, the distribution of a payoff is,…
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…
In many combinatorial problems one may need to model the diversity or similarity of assignments in a solution. For example, one may wish to maximise or minimise the number of distinct values in a solution. To formulate problems of this…
Mean-variance portfolio optimization problems often involve separable nonconvex terms, including penalties on capital gains, integer share constraints, and minimum position and trade sizes. We propose a heuristic algorithm for such problems…
We study a bilevel \emph{max-max} optimization framework for principal-agent contract design, in which a principal chooses incentives to maximize utility while anticipating the agent's best response. This problem, central to moral hazard…
Distributionally robust optimization is used to tackle decision making problems under uncertainty where the distribution of the uncertain data is ambiguous. Many ambiguity sets have been proposed for continuous uncertainty that build on…
We study problems arising in real-time auction markets, common in e-commerce and computational advertising, where bidders face the problem of calculating optimal bids. We focus upon a contract management problem where a demand aggregator is…
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in explanation methods for neural model predictions that offer precise formal guarantees. These include abductive (respectively, contrastive) methods, which aim to compute minimal subsets…
The minimum k-partition problem is a challenging combinatorial problem with a diverse set of applications ranging from telecommunications to sports scheduling. It generalizes the max-cut problem and has been extensively studied since the…
The problem of identifying the maximum edge biclique in bipartite graphs has attracted considerable attention in bipartite graph analysis, with numerous real-world applications such as fraud detection, community detection, and online…
In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an action from a set of actions, where each potential action…
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…
In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…