Related papers: Non-Cooperative Games with Uncertainty
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.…
We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
Mean-payoff games play a central role in quantitative synthesis and verification. In a single-dimensional game a weight is assigned to every transition and the objective of the protagonist is to assure a non-negative limit-average weight.…
Mill's classic argument for liberty requires that people's exercise of freedom should be governed by a no-harm principle (NHP). In this paper, we develop the concept of a no-harm equilibrium in $n$-person games where players maximize…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the…
Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from…
Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or…
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…
Probability forecasts are intended to account for the uncertainties inherent in forecasting. It is suggested that from an end-user's point of view probability is not necessarily sufficient to reflect uncertainties that are not simply the…
We introduce a new hypothesis testing-based learning dynamics in which players update their strategies by combining hypothesis testing with utility-driven exploration. In this dynamics, each player forms beliefs about opponents' strategies…
We give elementary examples within a framework for studying decisions under uncertainty where probabilities are only roughly known. The framework, in gambling terms, is that the size of a bet is proportional to the gambler's perceived…
A multi-agent system operates in an uncertain environment about which agents have different and time varying beliefs that, as time progresses, converge to a common belief. A global utility function that depends on the realized state of the…
Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium…
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs…
This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected…