Related papers: Deep Learning for Energy Market Contracts: Dynkin …
We propose a mean field game (MFG) framework to model the evolution of renewable energy production in competitive electricity markets. Producers interact through the spot price while optimising their profits under production, installation,…
Weather, technological and regulatory uncertainties expose actors in highly renewable electricity markets to substantial price and volume risks. Two-way Contracts for Difference (CfDs) can mitigate these risks. They stipulate payments…
In this work, a novel Stackelberg game theoretic framework is proposed for trading energy bidirectionally between the demand-response (DR) aggregator and the prosumers. This formulation allows for flexible energy arbitrage and additional…
We consider an energy system with $n$ consumers who are linked by a Demand Side Management (DSM) contract, i.e. they agreed to diminish, at random times, their aggregated power consumption by a predefined volume during a predefined…
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…
Contracts for Difference (CfDs) are forwards on the spread between an area price and the system price. Together with the system price forwards, these products are used to hedge the area price risk in the Nordic electricity market. The CfDs…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
We study the solution's existence for a generalized Dynkin game of switching type which is shown to be the natural representation for general defaultable OTC contract with contingent CSA. This is a theoretical counterparty risk mitigation…
In the modern power market, electricity trading is an extremely competitive industry. More accurate price forecast is crucial to help electricity producers and traders make better decisions. In this paper, a novel method of convolutional…
This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a…
This paper investigates the feasibility of using a discriminate pricing scheme to offset the inconvenience that is experienced by an energy user (EU) in trading its energy with an energy controller in smart grid. The main objective is to…
This paper studies the valuation and optimal strategy of convertible bonds as a Dynkin game by using the reflected backward stochastic differential equation method and the variational inequality method. We first reduce such a Dynkin game to…
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the delay of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this…
In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we…
This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's…
A Dynkin game is a zero-sum, stochastic stopping game between two players where either player can stop the game at any time for an observable payoff. Typically the payoff process of the max-player is assumed to be smaller than the payoff…
We consider Dynkin games for Markov processes associated with semi-Dirichlet forms. Dynkin games are the optimal stopping games introduced as the models of zero-sum games by two players. We prove that the solution to the certain variational…
We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…
Automated design of multi-agent interactions with desirable equilibrium outcomes is inherently difficult due to the computational hardness, non-uniqueness, and instability of the resulting equilibria. In this work, we propose the use of…
We study pricing and superhedging strategies for game options in an imperfect market with default. We extend the results obtained by Kifer in \cite{Kifer} in the case of a perfect market model to the case of an imperfect market with…