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Related papers: Selfish Mining under General Stochastic Rewards

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In this paper we revisit the mining strategies in proof of work based cryptocurrencies and propose two strategies, we call smart and smarter mining, that in many cases strictly dominate honest mining. In contrast to other known attacks,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2019-02-13 Guy Goren , Alexander Spiegelman

The core of many cryptocurrencies is the decentralised validation network operating on proof-of-work technology. In these systems, validation is done by so-called miners who can digitally sign blocks once they solve a computationally-hard…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-05-04 Sheng-Nan Li , Carlo Campajola , Claudio J. Tessone

Proof-of-Stake blockchains based on a longest-chain consensus protocol are an attractive energy-friendly alternative to the Proof-of-Work paradigm. However, formal barriers to "getting the incentives right" were recently discovered, driven…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , S. Matthew Weinberg

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2019-01-23 Soumya Basu , David Easley , Maureen O'Hara , Emin Gün Sirer

In this paper, we address the critical challenges of double-spending and selfish mining attacks in blockchain-based digital currencies. Double-spending is a problem where the same tender is spent multiple times during a digital currency…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-03-11 Seyed Ardalan Ghoreishi , Mohammad Reza Meybodi

Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-04-23 Ke Wu , Elaine Shi , Hao Chung

Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-08-24 Yunshu Liu , Zhixuan Fang , Man Hon Cheung , Wei Cai , Jianwei Huang

Abrupt changes in the miner hash rate applied to a proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain can adversely affect user experience and security. Because different PoW blockchains often share hashing algorithms, miners face a complex choice in deciding…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-06-20 George Bissias , Brian N. Levine , David Thibodeau

Mining pools, the main components of the Bitcoin network, dominate the computing resources and play essential roles in network security and performance aspects. Although many existing measurements of the Bitcoin network are available,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2019-02-22 Canhui Wang , Xiaowen Chu , Qin Yang

Proof-of-Work is a consensus algorithm where miners solve cryptographic puzzles to mine blocks and obtain a reward through some Block Reward Mechanism (BRM). PoW blockchain faces the problem of centralization due to the formation of mining…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-01-18 Varul Srivastava , Sujit Gujar

Mining fairness in blockchain refers to equality between the computational resources invested in mining and the block rewards received. There exists a dilemma wherein increasing the transaction processing capacity of a blockchain…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-09-10 Akira Sakurai , Kazuyuki Shudo

We compute the revenue ratio of the Trail Stubborn mining strategy in the Bitcoin network and compare its profitability to other block-withholding strategies. We use for this martingale techniques and a classical analysis of the hiker…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-11-26 Cyril Grunspan , Ricardo Pérez-Marco

Consider a set of parties invited to execute a protocol $\Pi$. The protocol will incur some cost to run while in the end (or at regular intervals), it will populate and update local tables that assign (virtual) rewards to participants. Each…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-01-03 Aggelos Kiayias , Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka

Bitcoin is firmly becoming a mainstream asset in our global society. Its highly volatile nature has traders and speculators flooding into the market to take advantage of its significant price swings in the hope of making money. This work…

Machine Learning · Computer Science 2021-10-29 Nathan Crone , Eoin Brophy , Tomas Ward

Incentive mechanisms are central to the functionality of permissionless blockchains: they incentivize participants to run and secure the underlying consensus protocol. Designing incentive-compatible incentive mechanisms is notoriously…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-08-06 Charlie Hou , Mingxun Zhou , Yan Ji , Phil Daian , Florian Tramer , Giulia Fanti , Ari Juels

Bitcoin has witnessed a prevailing transition that employing transaction fees paid by users rather than subsidy assigned by the system as the main incentive for mining.

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-01-01 Hongwei Shi , Shengling Wang , Qin Hu , Xiuzhen Cheng , Jianhui Huang

Cryptocurrency achieves distributed consensus using proof of work (PoW). Prior research in blockchain security identified financially incentivized attacks based on withholding blocks which have the attacker compromise a victim pool and pose…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-09-01 Sang-Yoon Chang

We describe and analyze perishing mining, a novel block-withholding mining strategy that lures profit-driven miners away from doing useful work on the public chain by releasing block headers from a privately maintained chain. We then…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-02-10 Tong Cao , Jérémie Decouchant , Jiangshan Yu

Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-02-15 Michael Tang , Alex Zhang

Bitcoin operates as a macroeconomic paradox: it combines a strictly predetermined, inelastic monetary issuance schedule with a stochastic, highly elastic demand for scarce block space. This paper empirically validates the Endogenous…

Statistical Finance · Quantitative Finance 2025-12-10 Hamoon Soleimani
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