Related papers: Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces
This work studies equilibrium problems under uncertainty where firms maximize their profits in a robust way when selling their output. Robust optimization plays an increasingly important role when best guaranteed objective values are to be…
CMO Council reports that 71\% of internet users in the U.S. were influenced by coupons and discounts when making their purchase decisions. It has also been shown that offering coupons to a small fraction of users (called seed users) may…
Algorithmic pricing raises a question of interpretation as well as intervention: when autonomous deep-learning pricing systems sustain supracompetitive prices, what strategic pattern have they learned, and how might market institutions…
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…
Motivated by the intricacies of allocating treasury funds in blockchain settings, we study the problem of crowdsourcing reviews for many different proposals, in parallel. During the reviewing phase, every reviewer can select the proposals…
The $\textit{data market design}$ problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the…
With the rapid growth in the fashion e-commerce industry, it is becoming extremely challenging for the E-tailers to set an optimal price point for all the products on the platform. By establishing an optimal price point, they can maximize…
Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, Procurement Auctions, and Wholesale Electricity Markets, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in…
Considering that a trader or a trading algorithm interacting with markets during continuous auctions can be modeled by an iterating procedure adjusting the price at which he posts orders at a given rhythm, this paper proposes a procedure…
Assortment optimization refers to the problem of designing a slate of products to offer potential customers, such as stocking the shelves in a convenience store. The price of each product is fixed in advance, and a probabilistic choice…
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) famously stated that prices fully reflect the information available to traders. This critically depends on the transfer of information into prices through trading strategies. Traders optimise their…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a central component of decentralized exchanges, yet their equilibrium foundations and microeconomic mechanisms remain incompletely understood. This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium framework for…
We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our…
Search and matching increasingly takes place on online platforms. These platforms have elements of centralized and decentralized matching; platforms can alter the search process for its users, but are unable to eliminate search frictions…
Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g., in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami et al. (2005) propose this problem…
We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem aims to design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to…
Platforms design the form of presentation by which sellers are shown to the buyers. This design not only shapes the buyers' experience but also leads to different market equilibria or dynamics. One component in this design is through the…