Related papers: Strategic Hiring under Algorithmic Monoculture

As the scope of machine learning broadens, we observe a recurring theme of algorithmic monoculture: the same systems, or systems that share components (e.g. training data), are deployed by multiple decision-makers. While sharing offers…

We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods to $N$ agents in an online manner, aiming to maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between fairness and efficiency. The goods…

Machine learning has grown in popularity to help assign resources and make decisions about users, which can result in discrimination. This includes hiring markets, where employers have increasingly been interested in using automated tools…

Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…

The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or…

Reinforcement learning has been shown to be an effective strategy for automatically training policies for challenging control problems. Focusing on non-cooperative multi-agent systems, we propose a novel reinforcement learning framework for…

There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two…

We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…

We study organizational elections in which each group nominates one candidate and receives as payoff its members expected utility under a probabilistic winning rule. We empirically justify a standard monotonicity assumption by simulating…

We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election…

We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We…

Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…

This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination…

Motivated by the complex dynamics of cooperative and competitive interactions within networked agent systems, multi-cluster games provide a framework for modeling the interconnected goals of self-interested clusters of agents. For this…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

Motivated by online platforms such as job markets, we study an agent choosing from a list of candidates, each with a hidden quality that determines match value. The agent observes only a noisy ranking of the candidates plus a binary signal…

It is known that individuals in social networks tend to exhibit homophily (a.k.a. assortative mixing) in their social ties, which implies that they prefer bonding with others of their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon?…

For effective matching of resources (e.g., taxis, food, bikes, shopping items) to customer demand, aggregation systems have been extremely successful. In aggregation systems, a central entity (e.g., Uber, Food Panda, Ofo) aggregates supply…