Related papers: Stable Matching under Matroid Rank Valuations
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
Very often in some censorious healthcare scenario, there may be a need to have some expert consultancies (especially by doctors) that are not available in-house to the hospital. With the advancement in technologies (such as video…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
We investigate computational and mechanism design aspects of scarce resource allocation, where the primary rationing mechanism is through waiting times. Specifically we consider allocating medical treatments to a population of patients.…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
In the Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas ($HR-Q^U_L$), the goal is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents matched to a hospital is either between its lower and upper quota or…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
In this paper, we present new results on the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents whose preferences correspond to {\em matroid rank functions}. This is a versatile valuation class with several desirable properties…
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…