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Accurately measuring time passing is critical for many applications. However, in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX, the time source is outside the Trusted Computing Base: a malicious host can manipulate the TEE's…
Timing-based side or covert channels in processor caches continue to present a threat to computer systems, and they are the key to many of the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks. Based on improvements to an existing three-step model for…
We propose Atomic Active Messages (AAM), a mechanism that accelerates irregular graph computations on both shared- and distributed-memory machines. The key idea behind AAM is that hardware transactional memory (HTM) can be used for simple…
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are vital for sequential data processing. Long Short-Term Memory Autoencoders (LSTM-AEs) are particularly effective for unsupervised anomaly detection in time-series data. However, inherent sequential…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
Transformers and large language models (LLMs), powered by the attention mechanism, have transformed numerous AI applications, driving the need for specialized hardware accelerators. A major challenge in these accelerators is efficiently…
We present IPU Trusted Extensions (ITX), a set of experimental hardware extensions that enable trusted execution environments in Graphcore's AI accelerators. ITX enables the execution of AI workloads with strong confidentiality and…
This dissertation rigorously characterizes many modern commodity DRAM devices and shows that by exploiting DRAM access timing margins within manufacturer-recommended DRAM timing specifications, we can significantly improve system…
Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A…
Scaling up language models has significantly increased their capabilities. But larger models are slower models, and so there is now an extensive body of work (e.g., speculative sampling or parallel decoding) that improves the (average case)…
Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of several state-holding microarchitectural components and have been…
The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, driven by time-to-market and cost considerations, has made ICs vulnerable to hardware Trojans (HTs). Against this threat, a promising approach is to use Machine Learning…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
Stream processing systems are important in modern applications in which data arrive continuously and need to be processed in real time. Because of their resource and scalability requirements, many of these systems run on the cloud, which is…
Timing-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors…
The confidentiality of trained AI models on edge devices is at risk from side-channel attacks exploiting power and electromagnetic emissions. This paper proposes a novel training methodology to enhance resilience against such threats by…
Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…
Sparse matrix vector multiplication (SpMV) is central to numerous data-intensive applications, but requires streaming indirect memory accesses that severely degrade both processing and memory throughput in state-of-the-art architectures.…
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardware-based root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged system and physical adversaries. In this work, we perform a black-box timing analysis of TPM 2.0 devices deployed on…
Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…