Related papers: Two-Sided Matching with Resource-Regional Caps
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…
Two-sided matching, such as matching between students and schools, has been applied to various aspects of real life and has been the subject of much research, however, it has been plagued by the fact that efficiency and fairness are…
We study a many-to-one matching problem, such as the college admission problem, where each college can admit multiple students. Unlike classical models, colleges evaluate sets of students through non-linear utility functions that capture…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
We consider the problem of matchings under two-sided preferences in the presence of maximum as well as minimum quota requirements for the agents. This setting, studied as the Hospital Residents with Lower Quotas (HRLQ) in literature, models…
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted $\mathcal{R}_1$ and $\mathcal{R}_2$. In round $\mathcal{R}_1$, the capacity of each…
In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number…
We study two-sided matching markets under hereditary constraints, which extend beyond simple capacity limits and arise in applications such as diversity requirements and refugee resettlement. In these settings, fairness and non-wastefulness…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
We study the trade-off between envy and inefficiency in repeated resource allocation settings with stochastic replenishments, motivated by real-world systems such as food banks and medical supply chains. Specifically, we consider a model in…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
We consider a one-sided matching problem where agents who are partitioned into disjoint classes and each class must receive fair treatment in a desired matching. This model, proposed by Benabbou et al. [2019], aims to address various…
We study a fair resource sharing problem, where a set of resources are to be shared among a group of agents. Each agent demands one resource and each resource can serve a limited number of agents. An agent cares about what resource they get…