Related papers: Diversity-seeking swap games in networks
We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…
The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or…
The Schelling model of segregation looks to explain the way in which a population of agents or particles of two types may come to organise itself into large homogeneous clusters, and can be seen as a variant of the Ising model in which the…
We derived the critical neighborhood demand in the Schelling's segregation model by studying the conditions for which a chain reaction of migrations of unsatisfied agents occurs. The essence of Schelling dynamics was approximated in two…
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…
We consider a Schelling-like segregation model, in which the behavior of individual agents is determined by a mixed individual and global utility. With a high ratio of global utility being incorporated, the agents are cooperative in order…
We study cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems where the activation cost of the server at any given time is a function of its load. We focus on monomial cost functions and consider both the case when the degree is less than one…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…
A version of the Schelling model on $\mathbb{Z}$ is defined, where two types of agents are allocated on the sites. An agent prefers to be surrounded by other agents of its own type, and may choose to move if this is not the case. It then…
We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
We describe a social game that we designed for encouraging energy efficient behavior amongst building occupants with the aim of reducing overall energy consumption in the building. Occupants vote for their desired lighting level and win…
Addressing issues of social diversity, we introduce a model of housing transactions between agents who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. A key assumption is that agents' preferences for a location depend on both an intrinsic…
We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users…
Motivated by real-world applications such as the allocation of public housing, we examine the problem of assigning a group of agents to vertices (e.g., spatial locations) of a network so that the diversity level is maximized. Specifically,…
A new class of multi agent single machine scheduling problems is introduced, where each job is associated with a self interested agent with a utility function decreasing in completion time. We aim to achieve a fair solution by maximizing…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…