Related papers: Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…

This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…

Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash…

We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and…

The game in which acts of participants don't have an adequate description in terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is considered. The model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a non-distributive…

In this paper, we study a class of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field games of controls with common noises and their corresponding $N$-player games. The theory of mean field game of controls considers a class of mean field games where the…

Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model is presented…

Supermodular games find significant applications in a variety of models, especially in operations research and economic applications of noncooperative game theory, and feature pure strategy Nash equilibria characterized as fixed points of…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When…

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic…

The fundamental laws of quantum world upsets the logical foundation of classic physics. They are completely counter-intuitive with many bizarre behaviors. However, this paper shows that they may make sense from the perspective of a general…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

We are interested in the study of stochastic games for which each player faces an optimal stopping problem. In our setting, the players may interact through the criterion to optimise as well as through their dynamics. After briefly…

In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some messages are received. Those games satisfy a crucial property of usual bi-matrix games: there are only a finite number of required (mixed)…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under…

Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…

We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…